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Power-games and organizational  learning:  
  Lessons for Organizations Management . 
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The paper uses the work of CROSS ( 1969) about negotiation to show that Time of conflict and 
power-games in the organizations are not so inefficient for the organization as it first would seem. The 
article shows especially that the more individuals in conflict use time for negotiation, the more they 
reduce their pretentions. As a notable result, this formal result is consistent with the Management 
Socio-Economic approach, Henri SAVALL (1981) developed. 
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Power-games and organizational  learning:  






 INTRODUCTION: TIME IN THE ORGANIZATIONS 
For many of the authors of Strategic Management such as SAVALL (1981), SAVALL and ZARDET 
(1995), the manager should pay very much attention to Organization and conditions of working within 
the organization, to communication and to Time-Management. These elements are very often at the 
origin of socio-economic problems of functioning within organization.   
 
Analyzing the organization, SAVALL (1981)1consider that there exist two distinct activities within 
the Organization: -the ones which directly contribute to the production of goods, and the ones which 
do not contribute directly to production and distribution of goods on markets but facilitate it. The first 
activities correspond to a time which is directly productive. The second correspond to the indirectly 
productive Time and represent tasks of concertation, control, management. And then, for SAVALL, 
the most one individual has got responsibilities in the organization, the most his ratio:
                                                          
1 Henri SAVALL, Professor of Management at the University of Lyon 2 (France) has founded a research and 
intervention center called “ISEOR” (Institute of Socio-Economics of the Organizations) which develop a 
methodology of audit founded on the observation and analysis of socio-economics problems of functioning. 
(Indirectly Productive Time/Directly Productive Time) is high. 
And the Socio-Economic Analysis of the Organizations SAVALL (1981) developed reveals that the 
indirectly productive Time can never be reduced to Zero for all the individuals. For a good functioning 
of the organization, all the individuals need time for collecting informations, and communicate with 
others... Experiences of an excessive rationalization have been very costly because it reduced the 
interest of the worker for his work (SAVALL,1981). At the opposite, when the organization leaves a 
possibility  of Time indirectly affected to the production, hidden performances are measured. 
(SAVALL and al. are specialized in the valuation of hidden costs and hidden performances in the 
organization. Hidden performance can result from a communicated suggestion that allows a 
productive change, it can comes from the realization of activities of maintenance that would not be 
achieved if the organization was excessively rationalized, these maintenance activities can make the 
equipment-life longer....) 
Then, the organization of time has to be structured in respect of the individuals. Each worker needs to 
be efficient to dispose of flexibility in the temporal organization of his work.  
 
 The object of this contribution is to mobilize Game-Theory to illustrate a particular aspect of 
the Socio-Economic analysis of Time structuration in the Organizations. Using the theory of 
negotiations, the modelization reveals that the time used by the individuals for negotiation in conflict 
is useful to and finally leads the individual to restrict their initial pretentions. It is then a particular 
confirmation of the theory of SAVALL (1981) 
  
 
 The TIME OF NEGOCIATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. 
The CROSS ( 1969) Theory of negotiation allows to take into account the individual learning when 
individual is integrated into a social group and submitted to negotiations. In this sense, negotiation is 
defined as a social relation which may lead an individual to accept concessions of actions or payments 
towards another one. 
In a N-size organization, let's consider that the agent "i" wishes to obtain from negotiation the quantity 
qi which can measure a wage-surplus resulting from negotiation or a more important participation to 
benefit or any qualitative recognition..... It is supposed that each player can appreciate which is the 
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concession-rate of the others. The player "i" considers that the concession-rate of player "j" is ij. 
 Ofcourse, individually considered, no one wants to make concession and then  ij.=0 
The total sum to share is M and it can be supposed that initially, the individuals collectively and 
without coordination wish to obtain more than is possible:  
  
i qi  ≥M      (Eq.1) 
That's the stake of negotiation and the origin of conflict. 
The player "i" considers that the time he needs to obtain an agreement giving him the 
objective-quantity qi he wishes to obtain is Wi with: 
   Wi = (i qi  - M)/j ij     (Eq.2) 
The sum qi he wishes to obtain represents for the agent "i" a utility U with 
Ui = f(qi ).e
aw
i
       
(Eq.3) 
Where ai is the actualization rate of agent "i". It is supposed that the more he has contacts with the 
other individuals, the more the agent "i" learns and corrects his estimations in function of the 
concession-rates of the others as described in Equation 4: 
 dij/dt = i (-qi   ij )     (Eq. 4) 
where i  is the learning-rate of player "i". 
Then, if he is rational, "i" will only make concessions if the time lost to pursue the conflict costs more 
than the gain which would result from the maintenance of his requirements. 
Note with Ci the cost the player pays for each period of negotiation. The actualized sum of negotiation 
costs will be: 
(Ci/ai ).(1- e
-aw
i )  and then the utility for requirement-maintenance is given in Equ. 5. 






i )      (Eq.5) 
The player "i" will fix the quantity qi he wishes to obtain from the power-game when maximizing his 
utility-function. That is (First Order Condition): 
  f’(qi )- f(qi ) + (Ci/ai ).(ai/j ij ) = 0     (Eq.6) 
This result is obtained after derivation of Wi vs qi (see equation 2). 
Following SEUROT ( 1979) and differentiating vs Time: 
  dqi / dqt =        -1                        . j dij /dt  (Eq. 7) 
        (f’’(qi )/f’(qi )).j ij- ai 
 
Consider then Ai = -i / ((f’’(qi )/f’(qi )).j ij- ai) then Eq 7 becomes: 
  dqi / dqt = (Ai/ i).j dij /dt    (Eq. 8) 
 
By assumption, d (j ij) /dt = j≠i (dij /dt) = -i (j qj + j ij)  (Eq. 9) 
 
Then,   dqi / dt = =        i                            . (j qj + j ij)   (Eq. 8) 
        (f’’(qi )/f’(qi )).j ij- ai 
 
This equation is a measure of the response-function of "i" to changes in the concession-rates of his 
rivals. f"(qi) < 0.  This means that the worker "i" is progressively less ambitious when he knows 
the concessions the other players are ready to do. This result confirms the evoked managerial 
analysis of SAVALL (1981). 
 
 CONCLUSION 
More the agent uses his time to learn which are the pretentions of the others and more he reduces his 
own pretentions. In terms of costs for the collectivity, the time used for this individual learning, which 
is unproductive, is finally beneficial to the organization. (See Appendix). Then, the time of 
Power-game Wi can allow to substantial economies. Unproductive Time may then be organizationally 
useful. This modelization which should be confronted to experimentations in the organization 
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confirms the relevance of a socio-economic approach to analyze the complex relations which 
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Given Eq. 9 and as  dWi/ dqi = 1/ ij,  
  
dqi / dqt =        -1                            .        1                      .j dij /dt  
      (f’’(qi )/f’(qi )).(-nai)        (f’’(qi )/f’(qi )).j ij 
 
Considering B =         -1                          .        1                        
      (f’’(qi )/f’(qi )).(-nai)        (f’’(qi )/f’(qi )) 
 
Then, dqi / dqt = B. (Wi/ qi) . (dj ij /dt) 
Consequently, because B≤0, more (dWi/ dqi) is high, the more the time to obtain a more important 
gain of one unit is important, and more the absolute-value of dqi/dt is important, that is more the 
individual reduces his pretentions. 
 Q.E.D. 
 
    
